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The Requirements of National Security
and International Aid
In Chapter VI we considered the factors making for an increase in
federal net debt resulting from following a countercyclical fiscal policy
during a business contraction, and deferred to the present chapter
questions relating to retirement of the added debt after the economy has
recovered from the contraction. Conditions making for or against retire-
ment of the debt incurred in the 1930's and conditions making for or
against retirement of the war debt must obviously be considered together.
And it will prove advantageous to have considered them before we
attempt to examine the possible significance of a countercyclical fiscal
policy for future changes in federal debt.
It will doubtless be conceded that a countercyclical fiscal policy
necessarily requires net borrowing during a business contraction. If one
asks why or how far a war should be financed by borrowing, or why or how
far international aid should be so financed, the answer can hardly be such
a clear-cut statement. But war financing has proverbially meant deficit
financing, and the limited experience we have had to date with inter-
national aid suggests that at least in wartime such aid is likely to be financed
in substantial part by borrowing.
In this chapter we will first note some factors making for wartime
deficits that have hitherto received inadequate attention, next examine
the bearing of international aid programs on federal financial require-
ments, and then turn to questions relating to debt retirement.
1. Would It Be Feasible to Pqy for a War as You Go?
It has often been suggested' that from a purely theoretical economic
viewpoint a war, even an all-out war, could be entirely financed by raising
taxes and other revenues as fast and as far as expenditures are increased.
Among the arguments advanced against such a pay-as-you-go program
are: that it would be more dampening to the ardor of patriotism than some
measure of deficit financing; that it would be likely to employ taxes that
would entail discouragements to maximum production increases; that
We are here concerned neither with the case for this suggestion nor with that
against it. in particular we are concerned neither to aflirm nor to deny the proposition
that a perfect pay-as-you-go policy—if one were feasible—would avoid price inflation.
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borrowing is a simpler, often a more equitable way to mop up the last
dregs of excess purchasing power; and that price increases, if limited in
extent, may be the easiest way to accomplish some of the necessary
reallocations of resources.
TABLE 45
















1814a 11.18 34.72 —7 110 68
1860b 56.1 63.1
1865c 333.7 1,297.6 99 392 74
1916b 1,080.0 1,040.0
1919b 5,500.0 18,380.0 136 557 70
1940a 8,600.0 10,800.0
1944a 58,200.0 109,000.0 144 227 46.5
Calendar year figures.
bFiscalyear figures.
CFiscalyear figures for Union only.
NOTE: Datafor 1811—65 are from HistoricalStatistics. Data for 1916—44 are from
Table 5.
These contentions have been dealt with extensively in various studies
of war finance, and it would be in the nature of a digression to go into
them here. For our present purpose it seems sufficient to hote that, to the
extent they are valid, they make a full-fledged pay-for-a-war-as-you-go
policy both economically inexpedient and politically improbable.
But even if all these contentions were to be summarily rejected, there
is reason to think some lag of revenues behind expenditures would be very
difficult to avoid, and that an important part of the explanation of war
deficits lies in the rapidity of wartime expenditure increases. Table 45
compares roughly computed rates of increase of receipts and of expendi-
tures in four wars. It also shows the percentage of deficit financing in the
year taken as the terminal year of each war. Nonfinancial expenditures
rose rather more rapidly during World War I than during the Civil War,
despite the fact that price increases were somewhat restrained. Taxes
and other nonfinancial receipts were stepped up most rapidly during
World War II. If there is a substantial problem of developing the tech-
niques of stepping receipts up rapidly—and we argue below that there
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is—Table 45 is consistent with the hypothesis that these techniques have
been improving. At all events tax rate increases were prompt enough and
large enough during World War I so that the percentage of deficit
financing in 1919 was less than that in 1865; and tax rate increases during
World War II were prompt enough and large enough so that the per-
centage of deficit financing in 1944 was markedly less than that in 1919.
It is evident that there was no real effort to make revenues increase
with expenditures during the War of 1812. And apparently William G.
McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury in 1913—18, after studying the Civil
War experience, concluded that that experience was of negative help
only, "teaching him what not to do" to finance World War 1.2
In respect to tax sources conditions were favorable in 1917
to a sharp step-up of tax receipts such as would be needed to implement a
pay-as-you-go policy. The inheritance tax (along with stamp taxes on
various business documents) had been successfully levied as a war emer-
gency measure in 1898—1901; and it had been reimposed in the 1916
Revenue Act. The Payne-Aldrich Act (1909), had established a corporate
income tax. And promptly after ratification of the 16th Amendment an
individual income tax had been included in the Underwood Tariff Act
(1913). But before our entry into the war the rates were modest. Only
16 per cent of 1916 budget receipts came from income and profits taxes, and
the inheritance tax did not yield anything during that fiscal year.
It might seem that Congress, with these almost untapped tax sources
at its disposal, could have enacted tax increases as rapidly as it enacted
the appropriations. As we have seen, in an emergency Congress has been
willing to adopt short cuts in the appropriation process. On the other
hand, when it comes to a revenue bill even during a war Congress is apt
to take its own time. In September 1916 to meet the expenditure increases
involved in the preparedness program a revenue act had been passed that
imposed moderate tax increases, and this had been followed by another in
March 1917 which raised inheritance tax rates and imposed an 8 per cent
excess profits tax. But despite the sharp increases in expenditures after our
entry into the war, agreement in Congress on a war revenue act was not
reached until more than three months after the armistice.3
But the fact that making war appropriations seems to be a more expedi-
tious process than levying taxes is probably only a minor part of the
explanation of the need for deficit financing during World War I. Any-
thing approaching a pay-as-you-go policy would have required leadership
from the executive; the administration never seriously entertained the idea
2PaulStudenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial History of the United States, p. 286.
'Underthe Act of February 24, 1919, taxes on 1918 incomes were sharply increased.
The effective rate on individual incomes of $3,000 to $5,000 was 0.86 per cent for 1917,
2.35 per cent for 1918, and 1.67 per cent for 1919 and 1920.
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of such a policy. And even if it had, in the absence of an executive budget,
a planned balancing of receipts against expenditures would have been
very difficult, particularly since to an important extent—--$4.7 billion in
fiscal year 1918—United States war expenditures were planned in the
first instance by allied foreign governments. Table 46 shows how far
expenditures were underestimated for 1917—19. Of course the fiscal 1917
estimates went to Congress late in calendar 1915; and the fiscal 1918
TABLE 46
Estimated and Actual Federal Expenditures, 1917—20
(millions of dollars)








NOTE: Prior to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 estimates were transmitted
to Congress rather more than six months before the beginning of the fiscal year. These
estimates were reprinted in Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Reports.
estimates were submitted several months before the United States entered
the war.4
One aspect of fiscal procedures that complicates the problem of
balancing revenues against expenditures is the lag of expenditures behind
the incurring of the obligations to make them. No doubt this complication
was more in evidence during World War I than in the 1920's and 1930's.
But partly because so large a part of the war expenditures—those for
loans to allied governments—were n.ot particularly subject to this lag,
it was not a major complication. However, it became so during World
War II, as Table 47 makes clear. Column 2 shows not obligations incurred,
but the newly enacted authority to incur them—that is, new appropria-
tions and contract authorizations.5 Total new obligational authority in
Much as at present, revised (midyear) estimates were submitted some twelve
months later. These midyear estimates for 1918—20 all erred significantly on the high
side.
Contract authorizations, like appropriations, convey authority to an agency such
as the Department of Defense to incur obligations to spend money. The Constitution
provides that "no appropriation of money [to support armies] ... shallbe for a longer
term than two years." The contract authorization is used to authorize contracts involving
expenditure commitments (not necessarily military) that run more than two years into
the future (for naval vessels these were formerly expressed in tons rather than dollars).
A contract authorization must be followed by an appropriation to provide for liquidating
the obligations incurred under it. (Congress is morally but not legally bound to make
such appropriations.) In addition to the appropriation and the contract authorization
Congress has in recent years conveyed new authority to obligate funds in the form of
"authorizations to expend from public debt receipts," e.g. for making loans.
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1941—45 exceeded total expenditures by more than $130 billion. Evidently
one way Congress in effect delegated a part of its discretion over expendi-
tures during this war was through granting somewhat more new obliga-
tional authority than the executive actually used.
Another fact that can be deduced from the table is that there must have
been a number of years during the 1940's (probably 1942-45) for which
the total of unliquidated obligations to spend money outstanding on July
TABLE 47
Federal Budget Expenditures, Appropriations, and Other Obligational
Authority Enactments, 1941—47
(billions of dollars)




1941 12.7 41.0 a -
1942 32.4 124.6 a
1943 78.2 81.0 22.Ob
1944 93.7 102.1 36.9
1945 100.4 54.6 51.2
1946 65.0 70.6 36.1
1947 42.5 39.0 1.1
a Notshown in the Budget.
b Appropriationsto liquidate contract authorizations.
NOTE: Column 2 represents new appropriations plus contract authorizations plus
authorizations treated as public debt transactions minus recisions. Column 3 represents
reappropriations plus appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations.
All figures refer to general and special account totals excluding debt retirement.
Figures for 1941 and 1942 are from Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States
Government; figures for each other year are from the Budget for the second following year.
1 was larger than total estimated expenditures for the year ahead. But
the amount of unliquidated obligations can only be roughly inferred from
Table 47, and from data presented in the wartime budgets. It was not
until after the great disparity between estimated expenditures and esti-
mated new obligational authority developed during the war that the need
for presenting a reconciliation between them in the Budget became urgent.
And then it took time and experience to develop a satisfactory way to
present such reconciliation in detail without adding greatly to the bulk of
an already exceedingly bulky document.6 But beginning with the 1953
Budget a reconciliation has been given.
With information on unliquidated obligations incurred at hand it
would seem that the making of short-term expenditure estimates should
be considerably facilitated. Indeed, a quarterly release of unliquidated
OAmongother things it took time to develop the concept "new obligational authority."
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federal obligathns giving well-chosen detail might prove to be a highly
significant addition to our current business information. But for Congress
during World War II the disparity between expenditures and new
obligational authority must have been a very confusing one. In fact, this
disparity seems to have caused a good deal of confusion ever since the
Budget began giving figures on it. Presumably, though, it will cease to be
a source of confusion once it comes to be generally understood. But general
understanding will not necessarily make prompter tax increases any
easier. Indeed, since the new obligational authority conferred on the
executive stepped up more rapidly than expenditures in 1941—44, mis-
taking the former for the latter may have helped to encourage prompter
and sharper tax increases.
On the whole in respect to both the information and the procedures
available the situation in World War II was far more favorable to making
prompt tax step-ups than it had been in World War I. By 1940 the execu-
tive budget system had been in operation for nearly two decades. This
provided the expenditure estimates needed for a planned relation between
expenditures and taxes. Under it, too, important progress had been made
in the technique of estimating tax yields, so that the executive branch was
in a much better position to give some leadership in the development of
tax bills. Perhaps more important, however, was what had been learned
since 1918 about the problems of financing a major war effort and the
increased influence of economists in dealing with these problems. Through-
out World War I Treasury officials, ignoring the effect of government
spending on private incomes, based their financing plans on the assump-
tion that with the government in the bond market on so large a scale the
total demand for funds was likely to outrun the supply. If not by 1940,
then not long after that, Treasury economists had come to understand
that "the income earned in producing output is necessarily equal to the
value of output produced ....Anylevel of production is potentially
self-financing at any level of prices."7
Table 48 compares for 1939-54 the budget estimates of expenditures
submitted nearly six months before the beginning of each fiscal year, the
midyear estimates, and the actuals. If there are still serious errors in the
budget figures in 1941—43, 1946, and 1953—54, the record is clearly a
considerable improvement over that of World War I. And the midyear
figures are in general quite good.
Between July 1, 1940, when the defense effort may be said to have
begun, and V-J Day, Congress passed six main revenue acts. During the
Committee for Economic Development Research Staff, Jobs and Markets, p. 12.
In other words, for all economic sectors (including the rest of the world) total nonfinancial
sources of funds equal total nonfinancial uses; hence, if the government has a nonfinancial
deficit, other sectors, taken collectively, must have an equal nonfinancial surplus and
be adding this amount to their net financial assets.
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defense program, while unemployment was still high, the administration
recommended tax increases and the imposition of an excess profits tax,
but qualified its recommendations with a caution against taxes that might
"restrict general consumption." Congress responded inthreeacts,
delaying the imposition of a tax on excess profits until the second and in
TABLE 48





































































general enacting smaller increases than those recommended by the
President. After Pearl Harbor the executive recommendations became
more categorical and in various messages President Roosevelt vigorously
stated the case for tax increases as an anti-inflationary measure. The first
of the war revenue acts, approved October 21, 1942, raised taxes sub-
tantially, but far less than he had proposed. The main accomplishment of
the second, approved June 9, 1943, was shifting the individual income tax
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Total Federal Budget Expenditures, Actual and Budgeted, 1939—54
(billions of dollars)
a This figure is on a 1947 basis. The difference between this and the 1946 basis was
apparently small for 1947.
NOTE: There were three main changes during the period covered by this table in the
definition of budget expenditures (formerly called general and special account expendi-
tures excluding debt retirement). On the adjustments made in the figures appearing in
the budget documents because of these changes see Appendix A.NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AID
to a current-payments basis, which added to tax collections in a year when
individual incomes were increasing. The third was considered so inadequate
by the President that he vetoed it (this was the first revenue act ever to be
vetoed). But Congress passed it over his veto February 25, 1944.
These comments on the experience during World War II make it
clear that some of the factors that hindered moving toward a pay-for-the-
war-as-you-go policy were primarily political. President Roosevelt never
proposed anything like a full pay-as-you-go policy—his most famous
anti-inflation message (April 1942) advocated no more than reducing
the budget deficit to 50 per cent of total budget expenditures—but
Congress could not see its way clear to going this far.
By way of giving some indication of the extent of the tax increases
during the defense program and the war we may note the following:








cent" 14.0 22.9 39.7 51.2 55.3 54.9 48.7
aBasedon Survey of Current Business; 1954 National Income Supplement, Table 3; and
Flow of Funds in the United StaSes, 1939—1953, Table 17.
bForcorporations reporting net incomes. Taxes comprise income and property
taxes levied on income of year indicated (fiscal year most nearly coinciding with calendar
year, including fiscal year ending the following June 30). Figures are based on Statistics
of Income for 1948, Part 2, Table 11.
During the defense program the expenditure increase was not so very
sharp—nonfinancial expenditures were $10.25 billion in 1939, $22.2
billion in 1941. Yet over 43 per cent of the 1941 outlay was deficit financed.
In 1942 nonfinancial expenditures totaled $64.5 billion, and since tax
collections.did not yet fully reflect the rates of the 1942 act, 63 per cent
of this amount was financed by borrowing. But in the following war years
the ratio of deficit to nonfinancial expenditure declined; the $50.8 billion
deficit in 1944 was only 47 per cent of the $109 billion expenditure total.8
Improved procedures and improved information helped to make the
proportion of expenditures financed by taxes and other current revenues
larger in World War II than in World War I. Presumably the proportion
would have been higher still had Congress been more favorably impressed
with the pay-as-you-go idea.
Let us imagine another occasion, and one on which Congress is per-
suaded that a pay-as-you-go policy is desirable. Even in such a situation it
8Thesestatements are based on Table 5.
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seems probable that present legislative procedures would be so slow that
tax receipts could not be pushed up fast enough to keep pace with ex-
penditures. However, if Congress could somehow divorce its consideration
of tax rates from its concern with amendments to the tax structure, the
legislative process required to raise rates might be considerably expedited.
A more radical possibility would be a tax statute authorizing and
directing the executive to make specified changes in tax rates to accord
with specified changes in economic conditions. In form this would be a
delegation of taxing power; but if the changes in rates and changes in
economic conditions were properly specified in the statute, there might
well be less delegation of tax policy-making power than was involved in
letting the executive plan and put into operation the various subsidy
programs it did in World War II.
2. How Far Need International Aid Be Financed by
Borrowing?
During and after both world wars the United States contributed large
amounts of aid to other countries. The amounts are summarized in Table
49. Nearly all of the aid during and after World War I took the form of
loans, although viewed in retrospect we are well advised to call the unpaid
ones grants. Also, most of the international aid advanced during World
War II was part of what has commonly (and somewhat misleadingly)
been called the lend-lease program. But, subject to one exception of con-
sequence and one qualification, we can say that operations under this
program up to V-J Day ought in general to be regarded as grants rather
than as loans or as lease agreements. The one exception is the silver loans—
the 335 million ounces of silver "lend-leased" to foreign countries are
classified in the table as credits. The qualification is that to date some
5 per cent of the grants have in retrospect been converted into credits (i.e.
into debts of the countries receiving the aid). Since V-J Day the bulk of
international aid has been quite frankly labeled "grants". And the total
of net new grants and credits extended to other countries, July 1, 1945,
to December 31, 1953 (line M), was nearly 10 per cent larger than that of
the grants and credits extended during the five preceding war years, only
about a quarter of the $44.3 billion for the postwar period being net new
(and in-retrospect-converted) credits.
During the 1920's it became doubtful whether the debts of the allied
governments to the United States could be collected. However, in the
funding agreements (the war loans had been payable on demand) only
limited concessions were made—concessions in amount of interest and in
lengthened payment periods rather than in principal. Then with the
coming of the recession, 1929—33, one country after another ceased making
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a moratorium. Most of the payments after the moratorium (there were
revisions in some of the debt agreements) came from Finland. Finland
paid $3.1 million, 1935—40. Total payments on principal account by all
countries from the start up to November 15, 1945, came to $758 million.
There is little prospect that any substantial part of the remaining prin-
cipal—or of the accrued interest—will ever be paid.9
It is interesting to compare the $11.9 billion of net new credits ex-
tended during and after World War II with the $9.5 billion of unpaid
principal of the earlier war period, despite the fact that the list of countries
is not entirely the same in the two cases. One naturally wonders how much
of the $11.9 billion, if any, will go the way of the World War I credits.
It would not be easy to say just what part of the international aid
recorded in Table 49 involved deficit financing.'In retrospect we have
reconstrued $9.5 billion of net credits extended during the earlier war
period as grants, and since grants are here treated as nonfinancial expendi-
tures, this amount contributes to the financial requirement shown for the
period. But we have—perhaps wrongly—treated the $11.9 billion as
credit extended and hence as an addition to the financial assets we deduct
from gross debt in computing net debt.
Some of the aid extended after World War I and a major portion of
that after World War II was extended during years in which the federal
government had a nonfinancial surplus. On the other hand the aid ad-
vanced during both wars contributed to the sharp expenditure increases
that were in substantial part financed by borrowing. There appears to. be
no reason why international grants-in-aid as such should require deficit
financing, particularly in the case of an aid program spread more or less
evenly over a number of years. Indeed, while a series of annual extensions
of credit aid in which year-to-year variations are no wider than in the
decade following World War II might well be excluded from a revised
concept of budget expenditures, some would argue that the funds so
advanced to other countries should in general be provided by taxes
rather than by internal borrowing.
It happens that the net federal debt was decreased from its 1920 peak
during the next eleven years by an amount not very different from $9.5
billion of the net new credits on line L that have since been reconstrued as
grants. But this approximate equality is doubtless a coincidence. If
at some future time several billion of the credit aid extended after World
War II were in retrospect to be reconstrued as grants, it is doubtful that
the consequent increase in the net federal debt figure would occasion the
retirement of a like amount of internal debt. But this possibility suggests
the broader question which is the topic of the following section.
But these "loans" are still carried as debts due the United States in the Annual
Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury.
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3. On the Retirement of Emergency-Incurred Debts
After the War of 1812 and to a large extent after the Civil War the war
debts were retired; but the retirements do not seem to have been the result
of a vigorous debt retirement policy. Table 50 indicates the course of the
debt (net of the general fund balance) after the two wars. At the end of
1815 the net debt stood at $114.2 million. In all but three of the next
twenty-one years there was a surplus, a major contributing factor to these
TABLE 50
Federal Debt Less General Fund Balance after Two Wars
(millions of dollars)
December 31 Net Debt June 30 Net Debt
1811 44.5 1860 60.9
1814 98.1 1865 2,651.5
1815 114.2 1866 2,643.3
1817 88.5 1873 2,091.5
1818 94.1 1875 2093.0
1830 34.4 1893 836.6
1836 —45.4
NoTE: Figures on gross debt are from Historical Statistics; on general fund balance
from Secretary of the Treasury, 1920 Annual Report, p. 776.
surpluses being the protective tariff. Although the rates imposed under
the 1816 tariff act were in general below wartime levels, they were high
enough so that the 1816 tariff has sometimes been considered the beginning
of protectionism. Duties were increased in 1824 and again in 1828, then
reduced in 1832 and 1833. Despite the duties, imports grew; the value of
imports was 11 per cent higher in the decade ending 1836 than in that
ending 1825.10 And of the total federal revenues11 from December 31,
1815, to December 31, 1836, customs duties constituted almost 80 per cent.
At the end of this period the general fund balance exceeded the small
amount of obligations outstanding by more than $45 million.
The process by which most of the Civil War debt was paid off was not
so very different. In both cases debt retirement was in large measure a
by-product of protectionism. Customs duties were increased during the
Civil War, particularly by the acts of 1862 and 1864. The ratio of duties
to value of total imports had been 15.7 per cent in 1860; it was 38.5 per
cent in 1865.12 A good deal of consideration was given to downward
revision of the tariff in the next twenty-five years. But the principal results
101-listoricalStatistics, M-54. Figures refer to years ending September 30.
"Totalin the sense of total nonfinancialreceipts other than postal revenues. See
Historical Statistics, P-89.
121923StatisticalAbstract, p. 799.
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were a 10 per cent horizontal reduction enacted in 1872 and repealed
in 1875; a mixture of upward and downward adjustments in the act of
1883; and the McKinley Act of 1890, which increased some duties and
conferred on the President limited power to levy certain duties on a
reciprocity basis by proclamation but substituted a subsidy on domestic
sugar for the previous duty on raw sugar imports. The following ratios of
customs duties to value of total imports indicate in a general way the
changes in the level of the tariff from 1870 to








Again despite these postwar tariff levels imports grew. In the decade
ending 1876 they totaled $5.0 billion; in that ending 1893, $7.4 billion.'4
So during the twenty-eight years following the Civil War customs receipts
were 43.5 per cent of total federal revenues.'5 In every one of these years
there was a surplus, and by June 30, 1893, the net federal debt had been
reduced to $836.6 million.
After both world wars political pressure to cut taxes was strong. It is
much easier to maintain customs duties at high wartime levels than
internal revenue rates. But there were other circumstances, too, that
militated against a policy of retiring all or most of the emergency-incurred
debt. During the 1920's, indeed, there was a good deal of discusssion of
such a policy, but the approximately $10 billion incurred in connection
with World War I to finance external loans was considered to be a
justifiable debt. If we were to count all of these loans—including the
uncollectable ones—as federal credit in 1929, and if we were to adjust
the net debt figures on line J of Table 51 accordingly, the record would
show a net debt of over $15 billion as ofJune 30, 1919, about half of which
was paid offduring the next decade. Still this debt retirement—it amounted
to about $8 billion on the Table 51 basis—was accomplished somewhat
inadvertently. As we noted in Chapter III, tax yields grew, reflecting
the rapid growth of GNP during the 1920's, while nonfinancial expendi-
tures were somewhat stable and the several cuts in tax rates were little
Ibid.
Historical Statistics, M-54. Figures refer to years ending June 30.
Seefootnote 10.
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enough and to give us a decade of surpluses. Thus the process of
partial debt repayment after World War I has something in common
with the debt repayment processes after the War of 1812 and the Civil
War; itwasaby-product of a legislative procedure thatwas slow in making
downward revisions in wartime tax rates,:
After World War II there was little sentiment in favor of retiring any
substantial part of the net debt accumulated during the war and the great
depression preceding it. Indeed, there was a good deal of sentiment against
TABLE 51





(as of December 31)
1954
A.Cash balaitce 1.25 0.33 27.2 5.2 5.7 6.0
B.Federal obligations held
by federal funds 0.59 1.02 37.8 44.7 58.3 61.4
C.Foreign loans and
securitiesa b b 1.6 13.4 14.2 15.1
D.Other federal credit 0.75 1.62 7.4 8.4 10.5 11.4
E.Total financial assets .
(A + B + C + D) 2.59 2.97 74.0 71.7 88.7 93.9
F.Direct and agency
obligations outstanding 25.95 18.80292.6266.4289.3294.4
G.Net accounts payable ° C 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.0
H.Total obligations and
accounts payable (F + G)25.95 18.80294.1 267.1289.9294.4
J.Net debt (H —E) 23.36 15.83220.1 195.4201.2200.5
a Includescapital subscriptions to IMF and IBRD.
b World War I obligations of foreign governments are not counted here as financial
assets. See Table 35, line L.
CNoestimate available.
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
debt retirement on any considerable scale, sentiment that was rationalized
by the contention that government surpluses would be likely to reduce
aggregate demand and cause unemployment.
Nonetheless net debt (see Table 51) decreased by some $19 billion
during the eight years ending December 31, 1953. And it seems highly
probable the decrease would have been greater had it not been for the
Korean War. Further, despite the contention regarding the depressing
effect of government surpluses, it seems fair to say the decrease that did
occur in some sense reflects a deliberate fiscal policy. However, as Table
51 makes clear, if there has been debt retirement since World War II it
has mainly taken the form of a decrease in net debt. In 1946, indeed, as
we noted in Chapter I, some $20 billion of gross direct debt was retired
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by drawing down the general fund balance. But since 1948 the gross
direct debt has been increasing.
If one tries to explain how it happened that net debt decreased by $19
billion during eight years in which there was a decrease of only about $4
billion in total obligations and payables outstanding, both the $16 billion
expansion of federal credit and the more than $20 billion increase in
federal obligations held by federal funds should be taken into considera-
tion. Also if one tries to construe the changes in debt during these years as
reflecting fiscal policy, presumably it is the budget surplus or deficit
rather than the $19 billion nonfinancial surplus toward which that policy
was immediately directed—and there was a budget deficit of some $17
billion during these eight years. Most of the $36 billion difference between
these two computations is mainly the result of the expansion of federal
credit (including the IMF and IBRD, it was chiefly external credit that
was expanded) and the growth of social insurance funds. Thus the postwar
decrease in net debt should be regarded as the joint product of a number of
factors, principally a budget deficit of $17 billion, a social insurance
funds surplus of some $21 billion, and a credit expansion of $16 billion.
A comparison of the four periods of postwar debt retirement we have
been reviewing strongly suggests two propositions. First, anything like
complete debt retirement is a policy objective that commands relatively
little political support. And second, there has been a marked downward
trend in the degree of debt retirement achieved.
If there has been little political support for a program of retiring
emergency-incurred federal debt, particularly since the 1930's, no doubt
a part of the explanation is that while there have in recent years been no
specific political interest groups that stood to gain by such a program there
have been specific interest groups that would have opposed it had
one been attempted. Such a program would have meant either substanti-
ally lower expenditures or substantially heavier taxation. And a consider-
able cut in expenditures almost inevitably would have meant a cut in
objects of expenditure that someone had a special interest in seeing
maintained. Likewise substantially heavier taxes obviously would have
meant opposition from those who would have had to pay them.
However there is one kind of tax that a special interest group can be
counted on to favor, namely, a "protective" tariff. We have noted that
maintenance of import duty rates played a major role in debt retirement
after the War of 1812 and the Civil War. No doubt the downward trend
in the degree of retirement of emergency-incurred debt reflects in part
the declining relative importance of customs as a source of federal tax
revenues.
But special interest groups are not the whole story. Those who have
been concerned in recent years about the possibility that retirement of any
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considerable part of the federal debt might mean depressed business and a
large volume of unemployment have been right to this extent. A decrease
in the government's nonfinancial deficit or an increase in its surplus exerts
a cyclically depressing influence on the level of aggregate demand. If the
concern about this depressing influence was stronger after World War II
than after World War I—and if accordingly there was less disposition
to advocate war debt retirement—this was a natural consequence of the
fact that federal fiscal operations had become so much larger in relation
to the other parts of our economy.
These comments are pertinent to the circumstances influencing the
prospects of retirement of our present federal debt. Of course different
considerations apply in the case of a debt of a country that is held ex-
ternally. The creditors are not a domestic special interest group.
Many writers, in discussing a countercyclical fiscal policy, have
assumed an approximate balance of receipts and expenditures over the
period of the cycle. But in our analysis of the circumstances influencing
federal debt retirement no distinction has been drawn between war debt
and the debt incurred in the 1930's. And this suggests a question: With
both special interests and a general interest aligned against debt retirement,
is it not more likely that the nonfinancial deficits incurred in periods of
relatively slack business would tend to exceed the surpluses of the periods
of brisker business? If so, the federal debt might continue to grow, cycle
after cycle. But we cannot entirely rule out the contrary possibility.
During the 1920's government revenues grew with the growth of the
economy, and grew fast enough so that there was a series of surpluses.
This could conceivably happen again.
What seems clear is that there is nothing in present fiscal procedures
that constitutes a mechanism for achieving a balance of receipts and
expenditures over the cycle, and that, in the absence of any such mecha-
nism, a substantial imbalance one way or the other is far more likely than
an approximate balance. But there is also the possibility that the govern-
ment might develop a form of capital budget that would provide just such
a mechanism by taking most of the cycle out of the current budget and
making it possible to balance every year's current budget approximately.
A budget system under which countercyclical expenditures on works
projects, state and local grants-in-aid, etc. would be charged to capital
account and amortized over a subsequent period of years such as a
decade would be a step in this direction, for it should be possible sub-
stantially to smooth the cycle out of budget expenditures in this way. And
presumably an analogous deferred-credits procedure could be applied to
a portion of tax and other receipts during the upper stages of the cycle in
such a way as to smooth year-to-year variations out of budget receipts.
If so, and if the receipts thus "smoothed" balanced the "smoothed"
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expenditures every year, there should be no secular trend either up or
down in the cumulative total of the unsmoothed net budget expenditures.
A well-devised budget system along these lines should provide a mecha-
nism for implementing the idea of balancing the budget over the cycle.
4. Summary
One reason for deficit financing during World War I was the primitive
nature of the then existing budgetary procedures. During World War II
the lag of expenditures behind appropriations became extremely import-
ant. This complicated the problem of relating receipts and expenditures,
but it may have done something to keep down the deficits. Shifting the
individual income tax to a pay-as-you-go basis in mid-1943 undoubtedly
helped thereafter to keep deficits down. The slowness of the legislative
process in the case of tax bills worked in the opposite direction during both
wars. This process might be expedited if Congress dealt separately with tax
rates and tax bases. Also there is the possibility of what has been called
formula-flexibility taxation.
The international aid extended during and after World War I and
that extended during World War II involved extensive borrowing. The
aid extended to other countries in the eight and one-half years following
World War II did not. Even if all the more than $44 billion extended dur-
ing this period were to be counted as grants—and this would mean adding
some $11 billion to the nonfinancial expenditures shown in Table 5—
there would still remain a substantial nonfinancial surplus. The difference
in the time patterns of expenditures in these contrasting cases is undoubt-
edly the main significant one. Aid extended at a rate that does not vary
too widely from year to year, no matter whether it takes the form of loans
or of grants, can be financed by taxes. Aid that contributes to a rapid
step-up of expenditures is likely to entail a resort to borrowing.
Such retirement of emergency-incurred federal debts as has occurred
seems for the most part to have been inadvertent. And during the nine-
teenth century it was helped by the fact that import duties were the main
source of federal revenues.
The lack of support for a debt retirement program, particularly after
World War II, reflects in part the fact that special interest groups would
have opposed such a program while there were no special interest groups
that stood to gain by it. But there is also a more general kind of opposition.
With federal fiscal operations on the scale they have now attained, any
large increase in nonfinancial receipts or large cut in expenditures would
exert temporarily a marked cyclically depressing influence on the level
of economic activity.
Our analysis of the influences making against .a program of debt
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retirement raises a question regarding the possibility that a counter-
cyclical federal fiscal policy might be followed in future in a fashion that
would result in a long-run balance of receipts and expenditures. With
present budgetary procedures an ever-growing federal debt seems far
more likely. So does another period of persistent inadvertent surpluses
like that of the 1920's. But an appropriate form of capital budget might
provide a mechanism for achieving a long-run balance of receipts and
expenditures.
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